The problem of indigenous knowledge in the definition of nature as a subject of law in the Ecuadorian Constitution

Abstract

A vast literature from Latin America attempts to explain the adequacy or inadequacy of nature as a subject of rights, beginning with its constitutionalization in Ecuador and similar legal systems in other countries. The debate has ranged from accusations of modern anthropocentrism to the still unresolved issues surrounding the existence of judicial enforcement frameworks. This article proposes that the problem lies not in this debate, but in a notion constructed and assimilated without discussion: the indigenous knowledge. This article argues, along with phenomenology, that as long as the ontological source of human knowledge is not identified, it is not possible to compare what is known, but rather the processes of knowing. The debate that has forced the entry of indigenous knowledge into modern law confuses the nature of knowledge itself with the functional-descriptive process of knowing, which is its consequence. Therefore, it is not possible to extrapolate indigenous knowledge to modern legal knowledge because they are different processes of knowing, not analogous knowledge. This is because the forms of knowing ultimately contribute only to a principle of unknown nature: the consciousness of things.